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COMMENT
BRZONKALA V. VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC AND
STATE UNIVERSITY: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
ACV-RECOGNIZING THAT VIOLENCE TARGETED
AT WOMEN AFFECTS INTERSTATE COMMERCE
INTRODUCTION
Every 15 seconds, a woman is beaten by her husband or boyf iend.
Every six minutes, a woman is forcibly raped .... Even women who
have not themselves been victims pay a high price for being a female.
They must routinely take precautions to protect themselves from the
omnipresent threat of sex-based violence
For four years Congress conducted extensive hearings
detailing the pervasive, yet often unrecognized incidents and
effects of violence against women. In September 1994, these
hearings culminated with Congress' passage of the Violence
Against Women Act ("VAWA), 4 in response to the overwhelm-
ing problem of violent acts against women in the United
1 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996).
2 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). This section of the Violence Against Women Act,
under which Christy Brzonkala brought her claim, entitle3 a victim of gender-
based violence to recover damages from her attacker.
These disturbing revelations were part of the testimony of Helen R.
Neuborne, then executive director of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund,
given before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Women and ilenee Hearing
Before the Comm on the Judiciary United States Senate on Legislation to Reduce
the Growing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women, 101st Cong. 57 (1990)
[hereinafter Senate Hearing 1990] (statement of Helen R. Neuborne, executive
director of the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund).
' Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994)).
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States. In part, VAWA provides a federal civil right and reme-
dy for victims of gender-based violence.5 VAWA declares that
"[a]ll persons within the United States shall have the right to
be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender."6 As a
remedy for violation of this right, in 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c),
VAWA sets forth a cause of action entitling the victim to dam-
ages.7 It was under this section of VAWA that Christy
Brzonkala brought claims against Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute and State University ("VPI") and several other individuals
based on her alleged rape by two VPI football players.8
In Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia held that "VAWA is an unconstitutional
exercise of Congress' power, unjustified under either the Com-
merce Clause or the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."9 This Comment argues that VAWA is a valid
exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause,
10
and as such is constitutional. Part I of this Comment briefly
outlines VAWA's legislative history. Part II reviews the facts of
Brzonkala and the district court's opinion, focusing on the
rationale used to find VAWA unconstitutional. Part III surveys
the United States Supreme Court's modern Commerce Clause
5 "It is the purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of
gender-motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities af-
fecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action
for victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994).
Id. at § 13981(b).
" Specifically, "[a] person (including a person who acts under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime
of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in
subsection (b) shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate." Id. at § 13981(c).
8 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 781.
Id. at 801. This was the first time VAWA was held to be unconstitutional. It
had been considered by a court once before. See Doe v. Doe, 929 F.Supp. 608 (D.
Conn. 1996) (holding VAWA to be a constitutional exercise of Congressional power
under the Commerce Clause). The court first considered whether Brzonkala stated
a claim under VAWA for the purpose of FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and concluded
that she did. Brzonkala, 935 F.Supp. at 801. See infra notes 46-50 and accompa-
nying text.
10 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Article I of the U.S. Constitution authorizes
Congress "[tio regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with Indian Tribes." Id.
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jurisprudence. Part IV analyzes the Brzonkala decision by
comparing and contrasting Supreme Court precedent to the
Brzonkala decision, focusing on United States v. Lopez," which
the district court heavily relied upon in formulating its deci-
sion. Finally, this Comment concludes that the district court
was incorrect in its understanding of and strict adherence to
the Lopez decision. Thus, the court should have found VAWA
to be a constitutional exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power since violence against women substantially affects inter-
state commerce.
I. VAWA's LEGISLATIV HISTORY
In 1994, Congress concluded that violence against women
substantially affects interstate commerce, and that, since its
effects are deleterious, it needs to be regulated on a national
level. In determining whether the wide ranging' regulations
proposed by VAWA were necessary, Congress held hearings
over a four year period, hearing testimony and compiling docu-
mentation on how gender-based violence impacts interstate
commerce and interferes with a woman's right to equal protec-
tion under the law.'3 Congress found that: 1) violence is the
leading cause of physical injury to women'4 and 2) homicide is
the leading cause of death of women in the workplace.'" In
addition to hearing shocking first hand and anecdotal accounts
of women being raped, beaten and otherwise terrorized, Con-
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 uncon-
stitutional as exceeding Congress' Commerce Clause authority).
*' The Act also authorizes spending $1.6 billion over six years for grants to
support state and local law enforcement and prosecution efforts to reduce violent
crime against women (42 U.S.C. § 3796gg), education and prevention programs (42
U.S.C. § 300w-10), battered women's shelters (42 U.S.C. § 10409(a)), and communi-
ty programs on domestic violence (42 U.S.C. § 40251). Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp.
608, 611 n.3 (D. Conn. 1996).
Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 610-11.
" Julie Goldscheid & Pamela Coukos, Vrlolence Against Women Affects the
Workplace.- Legal Remedies for Women and Advocates, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 195
(Special Issue 1996) (citing Patricia Horn, Beating Bach the Reuolution: Domestic
Vwlence's Economic Toll on Women, DOLLARS & SENSE, Dec. 1992, at 12-13).
1 Goldscheid & Coukos, supra note 14, at 196 (citing WOMEN IN PUBLIC SER-
VICE, HIDDEN VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AT WORK (1995)).
19971
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gress heard evidence that the ongoing victimization of women
had a large impact on the nation's commerce."6 The evidence
was overwhelming.
A. Impact on Employers
In determining that violence against women substantially
affects interstate commerce, Congress considered its effects on
businesses. This was an important consideration since women
16 Congress found, in part:
in 1991, at least 21,000 domestic crimes were reported to the police ev-
ery week; at least 1.1 million reported assaults-including aggravated
assaults, rapes, and murders-were committed against women in their
homes that year; unreported domestic crimes have been estimated to be
more than three times this total. Every week, during 1991, more than
2,000 women were raped, and more than 90 women were murdered-9
out of 10 by men. Women are six times more likely than men to be the
victim of a violent crime committed by an intimate; estimates indicate
that more than one of every six sexual assaults a week is committed by
a family member. Violence is the leading cause of injuries to women ages
15 to 44, more common than automobile accidents, muggings, and cancer
deaths combined. As many as 4 million women a year are the victims of
domestic violence. Three out of four women will be the victim of a vio-
lent crime sometime during their life. S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 37 (1993)
(footnotes omitted).
The Senate Report concluded that:
Gender-based violent crimes meet the modest threshold required by the
Commerce Clause. Gender-based crimes and fear of gender-based crimes
restricts movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health
expenditures, and reduces consumer spending, all of which affect inter-
state commerce and the national economy. Gender-based violence bars its
most likely targets-women-from full particularly [sic] in the national
economy. For example, studies report that almost 50% of rape victims
lose their jobs or are forced to quit in the aftermath of the crime. Even
the fear of gender-based violence affects the economy because it deters
women from taking jobs in certain areas or at certain hours that pose a
significant risk of such violence. This was precisely the rationale on
which the Supreme Court relied in upholding the 1964 Civil Rights Act
with respect to race (and presumably, sex as well). Id. at 54.
The House Conference Report found:
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect
on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling
interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from
transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce;
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect
on interstate commerce, by diminishing national productivity, increasing
medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and the demand
for interstate products.
H.R. Rep. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994).
[Vol. 63: 367
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constitute 50% of the labor force and 36% of the business exec-
utives in the United States. 7
Victims of gender-based violence suffer physical and psy-
chological effects in the workplace, which decrease individual
productivity and result in economic loss, in addition to the
victim's personal pain."8 In testifying about workplace con-
cerns, a representative of the Polaroid Corporation cited "such
bottom line issues as tardiness, poor performance, increased
medical claims, interpersonal conflicts in the workplace, de-
pression, stress and substance abuse."'
Similarly, in testimony before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Helen R. Neuborne, then executive director of
the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, presented sub-
stantial evidence of the effects of violence against women on
employers and commerce." Ms. Neuborne cited several stud-
ies. Statistics on abused women from a 1985 National Family
Violence Resurvey by the Department of Criminal Justice
report that women who were severely attacked (i.e., those
women who were kicked, bitten, punched, choked, burned,
beaten or had weapons used against them) spent twice as
many days in bed as other women, reported being in poor
health three times more than other women, had two times as
many headaches, four times the rate of depression, and five-
" Crimes of VwIlence Motivated By Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 43 (1993) (statement of Burt Neuborne, Professor of Law,
New York University;, previously served as National Legal Director of the ACLU;
member, New York City Commission on Human Rights).
18 Id.
' Goldscheid & Coukos, supra note 14, at 195 n. 2 (Special Issue 1996) (citing
Hearing on Domestic Violence: Hearing Before the Sub Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. (1993) (statement of James Hardeman, Polaroid Corp).
0 Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 68 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne).
The same evidence was also presented to the Senate in 1991 by the National
Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc. See Violence Against Women:
Victims of the System: Hearing on S.15 A Bill To Combat Violence and Crimes
Against Women on the Streets and in Homes Before the Comm. on the Judiciary
United States Senate, 102d Cong. 239-40 (1991) [hereinafter Hearing: Violence
Against Women] (statement of National Federation of Business and Professional
Women, Inc. on Violence Against Women, presented by Elizabeth Athanasaho, Na-
tional President). This evidence (in part) was presented to the House in 1993 by
Sally Goldfarb, senior staff attorney of the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund. See Crimes of Violence Motivated By Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House of Representatives Comm. on the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 13 (1993) (statement of Sally Goldfarb).
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and-a-half times more suicide attempts.2' Moreover, in a sur-
vey of abused women, 9.3% reported being absent from work
due to domestic violence, while 19% of those who were severely
assaulted missed time from work.22 Similarly, a New York
survey recently found that 54% of abused women miss three
days of work per month due to abuse, and 74% are harassed by
their abusers at work.' Harassment at the victim's workplace
and time spent waiting to appear in court reduces the victim's
ability to maintain or secure employment and increases absen-
teeism rates.' Absenteeism affects employers by increasing
their costs. Whether these costs are incurred by hiring tempo-
rary workers, suffering losses in productivity, or having to hire
new workers, they are all caused by violence against women.
Nationally, domestic violence has been estimated to cost
employers between three and five billion dollars annually due
to absenteeism from work.' Recent studies have documented
a decline in concentration and overall work performance of fe-
male victims of violence,2" which surely carries a great, if dif-
21 Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 68 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne)
(citing MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AiERICAN
FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMIES 426
(1990).
' Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne)
(citing MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
FAMILIES: RISK FACTORS AND ADAPTATIONS TO VIOLENCE IN 8,145 FAMILIES 157
(1990)).
' Goldscheid & Coukos, supra note 14, at 195 n.2 (citing New York City Vic-
tims Services Agency Report on the Costs of Domestic Violence, cited in NEV
YORK STATE DEP't OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATURE ON
EMPLOYEES SEPARATED FROM EMPLOYMENT DUE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 3 (Jan. 15,
1996)).
2 Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne)
(citing Conversations with Kristian Miccio, Director and Attorney in Charge, Sanc-
tuary for Families, Center for Battered Women's Legal Services, and Beverly
Sowande, New York Women's Bar Association, Committee on Battered Women
(June 12, 1990)).
' Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborno)
(citation omitted).
2 Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne)
(citing Milt Freudenheim, Employers Act to Stop Family Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
23, 1988, at 1). "Learned helplessness and depression, typical characteristics of the
battered woman's syndrome, may contribute to the deterioration of victims' employ-
ment performance. Learned helplessness, a feeling that the victim cannot control
the events in her life with the batterer, often generalizes to other areas of the
victim's life. Depression results in decreased motivation, loss of emotional and
physical energy and a lowered initiation of voluntary actions." Senate Hearing
[Vol. 63: 367
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ficult to quantify, cost to employers. Medical costs related to
domestic violence are estimated at about $100 million per
year,' and some of these costs are surely borne by employers,
even if only through higher insurance premiums.
Because women constitute a large segment of the work
force and the effects of violence against women are so perva-
sive, such violence clearly affects economic concerns and just
as clearly has an adverse impact on interstate commerce.
B. Economic Impact on Women
Although the impact of violence against women on employ-
ers and employees is certainly interrelated, some economic
impacts are more intensely felt by women as individuals. The
Statement of the National Federation of Business and Profes-
sional Women, Inc. ("BPW"), which was presented to the Sen-
ate in 1991, made clear that, in addition to affecting employ-
ers, violence against women affects women in their role as
employees.' A 1980 psychological journal reported that close
to 50% of rape victims studied were forced to quit their jobs
within the year following the rape.' A Minnesota study re-
ported that one-third of the women studied said that their
abusing husbands had prohibited them from working, one-
fourth said their abusing husband had prohibited them from
going to school; almost 25% said that they lost a job partly due
to being abused; and over 50% said that their abuser harassed
them at work either by phone or in person." An American
Insurance Association pilot study found that 40% of battered
women studied lost a job due to abuse and over 70% were
harassed at work by the abuser. Furthermore, over half of the
women studied reported late for work five or more times each
month and missed work three days a month due to abuse."
1990, supra note 3, at 77 n.34 (statement of Helen &. Neuborne) (citing C. EWING,
BATrERED WOMEN WHO KILL 20-21 (1987).
=' Senate Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne)
(citation omitted).
' Rearing: Vilence Against Women supra note 20, at 240-41 (statement of Na-
tional Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc. on Violence Against
Women, presented by Elizabeth Athanasakos, National President).
"Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 242.
"Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 242-43.
"Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 243.
1997]
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In addition, the fear of violence affects women's economic
opportunities. Fear of being out late at night or of taking pub-
lic transportation drastically reduces the number of job oppor-
tunities a woman may consider. 2 Women who cannot leave
their homes or are afraid or embarrassed to show the physical
effects of violence will forego available employment opportuni-
ties or jeopardize their current employment by absenteeism or
poor work performance.3
Violence not only affects current employees, but potential
future employees as well. Congress heard testimony demon-
strating that violence against women particularly affects fe-
male college students. One study reported that a woman col-
lege student has a one in thirteen chance of being raped in a
given year.34 Women victimized by rape while attending col-
lege often drop out of school or at least interrupt their atten-
dance to avoid the attacker. 5 Ultimately, the effect on college
attendance affects future careers (or the lack thereof), and
therefore, women's economic position in society. This violence
also affects employers by keeping potentially well educated and
qualified applicants from entering the job market.
Violence against women affects employers and women in
their role as employees as well as on an individual basis. Effec-
tively, it keeps women from fully participating in the economy
and often keeps them out of the job market. It further burdens
commerce by causing businesses to incur substantial, other-
wise unnecessary costs. In the aggregate, the numerous, recur-
ring instances of violence against women surely have a sub-
stantial, negative impact on interstate commerce.
3 Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 241. See also Senate
Hearing 1990, supra note 3, at 69 (statement of Helen R. Neuborne).
Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 241 (statement of Na-
tional Federation of Business and Professional Women, Inc. on Violence Against
Women, presented by Elizabeth Athanasakos, National President).
3 Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 243.
Hearing: Violence Against Women, supra note 20, at 243. This is exactly
what happened to Christy Brzonkala. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 63: 367
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11. THE BRZONKALA CASE
A. Alleged Facts
Christy Brzonkala is an adult female who attended Virgin-
ia Polytechnic Institute and State University. On the night of
September 21, 1994 and the morning of the next day,
Brzonkala was raped in a room on the third floor of her dormi-
tory by two men whom she and Hope Handley, another female
student, had met less than a half hour earlier and whose iden-
tities she knew only by their first names and their status as
VPI football players.36 Initially, Brzonkala and Handley, along
with Antonio Morrison and James Crawford, the two football
players they had just met, were present in the room. Handley
and Crawford left the room after fifteen minutes of conversa-
tion; Morrison then requested intercourse with Brzonkala.
Brzonkala audibly responded "no" twice and then attempted to
leave. Morrison forced her face-up onto a bed, pushed her down
by her shoulders and forcibly disrobed her. Morrison used his
hands to pin her down by her elbows, pressed his knees
against her legs, and forced her to submit to vaginal inter-
course.
37
Brzonkala attempted to push Morrison off, but before she
could recover, Crawford returned, exchanged places with Mor-
rison, and forced Brzonkala to submit to vaginal intercourse by
pinning down her arms and placing his knees against her legs.
Morrison then exchanged places with Crawford and forced
Brzonkala to submit to vaginal intercourse a third time. Nei-
ther Morrison nor Crawford used a condom.'
After raping her the second time, Morrison said to
Brzonkala, "You better not have any fucking diseases.'
Sometime after this, Morrison announced publicly in the
dormitory's dining hall and in the presence of at least one
"Brzonkala 935 F. Supp. at 781-82.





female student, "I like to get girls drunk and fuck the shit out
of them." In February 1995, Brzonkala recognized Morrison
and Crawford as the two men who had raped her.4"
In April 1995, Brzonkala filed a complaint against the two
men under VPrs Sexual Assault policy. After a hearing, the
VPI judicial committee found Morrison guilty of sexual assault
and suspended him from school for two semesters. The commit-
tee found the evidence against Crawford insufficient to take
action.4' After a second hearing and an appeal, Morrison's
suspension was set aside and he returned to VPI for the Fall
1995 semester. VPI failed to notify Brzonkala of his impending
return; she learned of the result through a newspaper article.
Fearing that Morrison's return to campus would jeopardize her
personal safety, Brzonkala canceled her plans to return to VPI
for the Fall semester.42
In March 1996, Brzonkala filed a complaint with the Unit-
ed States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
alleging violations of Title IX of the Education Amendment
Act,43 Title Ill of VAWA," and various state laws. Claims
were brought against VPI, William Landsidle in his capacity as
Comptroller of the Commonwealth, and three VPI football
players: Antonio Morrison, James Crawford and Cornell
Brown. The claims against VPI, Landsidle and Brown were
dismissed.45 The court only considered the VAWA claim and
some state law claims against Morrison and Crawford.46
B. The Decision
1. The Sufficiency of Brzonkala's Claim
The court first considered whether the complaint suffi-
ciently stated a claim under the standard of Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). In terms of the VAWA claim, this sufficiency was
measured by whether Brzonkala had adequately alleged that
40 Id. at 782.
4' Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 782.
42 Id.
' 29 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
" 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
4' Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 781.
46 Id.
[Vol. 63: 367
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her rape was a "crime of violence motivated by gender."' In
finding that Brzonkala's complaint sufficiently stated a claim,
the court relied on general guidelines for identifying hate
crimes, such as: the "language used by the perpetrator; the
severity of the attack (including mutilation); the lack of provo-
cation; previous history of similar incidents; absence of any
other apparent motive (battery without robbery, for example);
common sense. . ". .' The court found that "gender animus
more likely played a part in these rapes than in some other
types of rape."49
In reaching this decision the court considered: 1) this was
a gang rape-indicating a conspiracy of disrespect for the wom-
an; 2) this was stranger rape-indicating disrespect solely on
the basis of being a woman, as the perpetrators had no knowl-
edge of her personality; and 3) the comments made by Morri-
son immediately after the rape and some time after-further
evidencing his disrespect for Brzonkala, and women in general,
and possibly indicating a history of similar incidents.!' The
court decided that, as against Morrison, Brzonkala had stated
a claim under federal pleading's minimum requirements for
violation of VAWA. As to Crawford, the court found it unneces-
sary to decide whether Brzonkala had stated a claim since the
court's decision would render VAWA an unconstitutional exer-
cise of Congress' Commerce Clause power regardless."1
2. Commerce Clause
Congress based its authority to enact VAWA on the Com-
merce Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution. 2 The Brzonkala court rejected VAWA's basis in the
Commerce Clause as unfounded and unconstitutional using the
analysis developed by the Supreme Court in United States v.
-7 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994). '[T]he term crime of violence motivated by
gender means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of
gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender. Id.
" Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 784 (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-138, at 49-50).
"Id.
Id. at 784-85. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
', Id. at 785. The court did not state the rationale for its distinction between
Morrison and Crawford. Id
52 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994). See supra note 10. This Comment will not ad-
dress the equal protection issue.
1997]
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Lopez."3 The Lopez Court found that Congress, under its com-
merce power, may regulate three broadly defined categories of
activity, 1) "the use of the channels of interstate commerce"; 2)
"the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities"; and 3) "those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."' In
Lopez, the Court concluded that, in order to qualify for the
third category, the regulated activity must "substantially af-
fect" interstate commerce."
The court eliminated the first two categories almost imme-
diately and focused on applying the Lopez analysis of substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce to the facts of Ms.
Brzonkala's claim.56 The court found the differences between
the two cases to be insignificant and the similarities to be
controlling.57 The similarities identified by the court included:
"(1) the criminal nature of both statutes, (2) the non-commer-
cial nature of both statutes, (3) the lack of a jurisdictional
requirement that some effect on interstate commerce is in-
volved in each case, (4) the remoteness of any effect on com-
merce, and (5) the excessive congressional power that would
logically follow from permitting both statutes based on the
Commerce Clause.""s Therefore, the court treated the statute
at issue in Brzonkala as indistinguishable from the one at
issue in Lopez for purposes of deciding its constitutionality.
The district court's reading of Lopez concluded that Com-
merce Clause analysis is now divided between situations where
regulated intrastate activity is economic in nature and situa-
" U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying
text.
5, Id. at 558-59.
5' Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 786 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
557-60 (1995)).
"6 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 786. The court, in saying that VAWA does not
fit in either of the first two categories, limited its analysis to the following:
"[a]dmittedly women often travel between states, as do their abusers and assail-
ants, but certainly more is required to qualify for the commerce power." Id. Cer-
tainly one could formulate arguments to support the inclusion of VAWA in either
of these two categories (e.g., women are often forced to travel interstate to flee
abuse or are restricted from traveling by their abuser), but this Comment will
focus on the "substantial effect" category.
67 Id. at 789.
58 Id.
[Vol. 63: 367
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tions where it is not. "After Lopez, cases such as Wickard [v.
Filburn],59 where regulated intrastate activity is economic in
nature, do not control cases where regulated intrastate activity
is not economic. At the least, after Lopez, whether intrastate
activity is economic in nature is a very relevant consider-
ation."0 The district court concluded that "a reasonable ad-
herence" to the Lopez decision shows that Congress exceeded
its Commerce Clause Power in enacting VAWA6
Ill. THE SUPREME COURT'S COMIERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Economic Activities and the Commerce Clause
For nearly sixty years, the United States Supreme Court
has upheld Congress' power to regulate activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.
Beginning in the 1930s, Congress extended its use of the Com-
merce Clause to pass President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New
Deal reforms.62 In 1937, the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") under Congress' Commerce Clause
power.'e The Court reasoned that intrastate activities fall
within Congress' power if they bear such a close and substan-
tial relationship to commerce as to make their control essential
or appropriate to protect the involved commerce from burdens
or obstructions." This decision was followed by United States
"See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 787.
61 Id. at 793. The court also addressed an equal protection issue. The court
found, based on Supreme Court precedent, that the Fourteenth Amendment regu-
lates state action only and cannot reach private conduct without some state action.
Id. at 793-94. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). Since there was
no state action connected to the private conduct in Brzonkala, the court found that
VAWA was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Enforcement
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 801.
' Sheila A. Mikhail, Reversing the Tide Under the Commerce Clause, 86 J.
CRmL L. & CRBIMNOLOGY 1493, 1498 (1996). After the Court initially resisted,
President Roosevelt attempted to pack the Court. Subsequently, scven of the nine
Supreme Court Justices retired, and the President was able to obtain approval of
his New Deal legislation. Id.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
Id. A labor organization claimed that a corporation was obstructing its
employees' rights to form a union in violation of the NLRA. Id. at 25. This hold-
ing stemmed from. the fact that the NLRA was enacted to prevent strike, which,
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v. Darby65 in 1941, which upheld the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"). In Darby, the Court held that Congress' power
over interstate commerce is not limited to regulating commerce
between states. Congress' power extends to intrastate activities
"which so affect interstate commerce.., as to make regulation.
of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end. 66
The "most far reaching example of Commerce Clause au-
thority over intrastate activity"7 was Wickard v. Filburn,
which involved a farmer harvesting more wheat than was le-
gally permitted under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
This harvesting was held to be subject to regulation, even
though the wheat was harvested not for sale, but for the
farmer's own consumption.' The Court stated that home-
grown wheat competes with wheat in interstate commerce be-
cause "it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would
otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market."
The Court noted that the individual effect of Filburn's actions
may not have had a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
but that these types of acts, taken in the aggregate, do have a
substantial effect.70 Thus, Congress' power extends to the reg-
ulation of individual acts that do not, by themselves, substan-
tially affect commerce.
B. Civil Rights and the Commerce Clause
The Court has also upheld Congress' ability to enact civil
rights statutes under the Commerce Clause power. In Heart of
Atlanta Motel,7 the Court upheld Title II of the Civil Rights
if not prevented, could potentially cause the disruption or closing of the
corporation's mines, warehouses and steamships located in other states. Id. at 33-
36, 41-42.
312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941). The federal government
had indicted Darby for transporting lumber interstate since it was produced by
workers that were paid less than the minimum wage prescribed by the FLSA or
had worked more than the prescribed maximum hour limit. Id. at 111.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
68 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
69 Id. at 128.
7' Id. at 127-28.
71 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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Act of 1964 7 2 as applied to a motel which refused to accommo-
date people on the basis of race. The Court concluded that
racial discrimination adversely affected interstate commerce by
impeding interstate travel." Congress was not restricted from
enacting this legislation even though it primarily regulated
what was also deemed to be a social and moral wrong.74 The
social and moral ends of this legislation did not detract from
the adverse effects of racial discrimination on interstate com-
merce.
Even if the operation of a motel may be considered an
intrastate activity, the Court concluded, "if it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
opetation which applies the squeeze." Therefore, Congress'
power to protect and promote interstate commerce includes
"the power to regulate local incidents thereof,... which might
have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce.
To this end the Court deferred to congressional judgment since
Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimi-
nation by motels affected commerce and the means selected to
eliminate the discrimination were reasonable and appropri-
ate.77
In Katzenbach v. McClung," the Court similarly upheld
an application of Title HI to Ollie's Barbecue, a small, local
restaurant in Birmingham, Alabama. Using the reasoning
employed in Wickard, the Court found that although the value
of food purchased solely by Ollie's Barbecue that traveled in
interstate commerce was insignificant, the restaurant's dis-
criminatory conduct was representative of establishments
throughout the country. Aggregated, this conduct had a sub-
- Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000(a)-2000(b) (1988) (providing for injunctive relief for discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion or national origin in places of
public accommodation)).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 253. Interstate travel is not only
displeasurable and inconvenient when one is uncertain of obtaining lodging, it is
often made virtually impossible. Id.
74 Id. at 257.
Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mrs. AS'n, 336
U.S. 464, 464 (1949)).
76 Id.
Id. at 258, 261-62.
78 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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stantial effect on interstate commerce since restaurants sold
and ultimately bought less interstate goods because of the
discrimination. 9 The Court again deferred to congressional
judgment, holding that all that was necessary to uphold the
statute was a rational basis to find that racial discrimination
adversely affected the free flow of interstate commerce.'
C. Legislative Deference/Rational Basis
Although the Court has often deferred to legislative judg-
ment in Commerce Clause cases, Perez v. United States1
marked the most extreme example of such deference. There,
the Court held that Title II of the Consumer Credit Protection
Act,82 which made extortionate credit transactions a federal
crime, was a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power. The Court reasoned that these transactions, known as
"loan sharking," accounted for a substantial portion of the
income of organized crime syndicates, many of which operated
interstate.' Congress found that even where these transac-
tions were purely intrastate, they nevertheless directly affected
interstate commerce." Thus, "under the statute ... a man
can be convicted without any proof of interstate movement, of
the use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or of facts
showing that his conduct affected interstate commerce."85 Yet,
Congress may still regulate pursuant to its Commerce Clause
power.
These cases demonstrate Congress' extensive power to
legislate in areas as various as labor relations, civil rights and
criminal law. The Court has deferred to congressional judg-
ment upon recognizing that Congress has a rational basis for
finding that the activity being regulated, either alone or in the
7, Id. at 300-01.
"0 Id. at 304.
81 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
8 Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146, 159-64 (1968) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 891-896)).
Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-57.
Id. at 156.
Id. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. This view
prevailed for almost sixty years until the Lopez decision in
1995.'
D. United States v. Lopez'
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court, in a five-
four decision, diverged from decades of Commerce Clause juris-
prudence when it struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act
of 1990, which was enacted under Congress' Commerce Clause
power. The Gun-Free School Zones Act made it a federal of-
fense to knowingly possess a firearm at a place known or rea-
sonably believed to be a school zone.' The Court held that
the Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power since it
"neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a require-
ment that the possession be connected in any way to interstate
commerce."
8 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, first
recounted the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence, and
then identified the three broad categories of activity that may
be regulated by Congress under its commerce power.' The
Court disposed of the first two categories and determined that
to sustain the Gun-Free School Zones Act, it must be under the
third category, regulation of an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.9 The Court then characterized
its prior Commerce Clause decisions as upholding congressio-
nal Acts which regulate "intrastate economic activity that sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.'
- 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
87 Id.
18 U.S.C. § 922(q)X1)(A) (1988).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
Id. at 558-59. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
' Without any discussion or analysis, the Court concluded '§ 922(q) is not a
regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it an attempt
to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels of
commerce; nor can § 922(q) be justified as a regulation by which Congress has
sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing in inter-
state commerce." Id. at 559.
9Id. (emphasis added). The Court further stated, "the pattern is clear. Where
economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating
that activity will be sustained." Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, this pattern
had never before been articulated or put into this light by any of the Court's prior
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The Court went on to distinguish Lopez from these "eco-
nomic" decisions which upheld prior Acts under the Commerce
Clause rationale. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act:
is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "com-
merce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one
might define those terms .... It cannot, therefore, be sustained
under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of
or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce."
Next, the Court noted that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, on a
case-by-case basis, that the gun possession prohibited by the
Act would affect interstate commerce. 4
The Court then considered legislative history. The Govern-
ment conceded that there were no express Congressional find-
ings demonstrating the effects on interstate commerce of fire-
arm possession in a school zone on interstate commerce.9'
Since there was no legislative history, the Court followed pre-
cedent in stating that Congress is not required to make partic-
ularized findings as to the substantial effects that an activity
has on interstate commerce. 6 However, the Court noted that,
to the extent that legislative findings would allow the evalua-
tion of whether the regulated activity substantially affected
interstate commerce, even though such an effect was not visi-
ble to the naked eye, legislative findings were lacking in this
case.
9 7
Finally, the Court considered the Government's argument
that possession of a firearm in a school zone substantially af-
fects interstate commerce. It was argued that the possession of
a firearm may result in violent crime, that the costs of violent
crime are substantial, and that these costs are then spread
throughout the population through insurance.98 The Govern-
ment also claimed that violent crime reduces people's willing-
decisions.
93 Id. at 561.
94 Id.
" Id. at 562 (citing Brief for the United States 5-6).
' Id. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 304. See also Perez, 402 U.S. at 166.
,7 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
" Id. at 563-64.
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ness to travel to perceived unsafe areas.' Additionally, the
presence of guns in schools handicaps the educational process,
resulting in a less productive citizenry, which will have an
adverse effect on the nation's economic health.' These fac-
tors, the Government contended, could result in Congress ra-
tionally concluding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.''
The Court disagreed. According to the Court, under the
Government's reasoning, "Congress could regulate not only all
violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent
crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate
commerce. Similarly, ... Congress could regulate any activity
that it found was related to the economic productivity of indi-
vidual citizens .. . ."02 Therefore, it could not imagine any
activity by an individual that Congress could not regulate."
The Court concluded that to uphold Congress' power to
legislate in this area, it "would have to pile inference upon
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general po-
lice power of the sort retained by the States." '
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Application of Lopez to the Brzonkala Case
Disregarding decades of Supreme Court Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the Brzonkala court simply and exclusively
applied the reasoning of Lopez to the Brzonkala case. Since the
language and rationale of the Brzonkala court is essentially
identical to that of the Lopez Court, the errors in analysis and
reading of precedent are common to both cases.
The Brzonkala court's formalistic adoption of the Lopez
analysis is both troubling and difficult to understand in that
Lopez itself does not overrule the Court's previous Commerce




-'Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
*3Id.
"' Id. at 567.
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firms its previous cases, citing them as precedent."5 For ex-
ample, the Court concludes: "[Tihe broad language in [prior]
opinions has suggested the possibility of additional [Commerce
Clause] expansion, but we decline here to proceed any fur-
ther."0 6 Lack of further expansion of Congressional power in
no way suggests placing any constraints on what had previous-
ly been Congress' domain.
In the Brzonkala decision, the District Court strictly ad-
hered to Lopez and applied a step-by-step analysis almost
identical to the one used in Lopez.0 7 The Brzonkala court
misunderstood and misapplied precedent in concluding that
VAWA does not regulate an economic activity and as such does
not fall within the realm of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
Further, the court ignored the Supreme Court's continued
endorsement of Congress' use of the Commerce Clause to ad-
vance the cause of civil rights and the precedent of courts de-
ferring to legislative judgment if there is a rational basis for
finding that the regulated activity substantially affects com-
merce.
1. The Nature of the Regulated Activity: Economic v.
Non-Economic
Contrary to the Lopez Court's assertion,'0 8 a careful
study of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence prior to Lopez
makes it clear that its Commerce Clause holdings were based
on the effect that the regulated activities had on interstate
commerce, not whether the activities themselves were econom-
'0 Id. at 555-59.
'0 Id. at 567.
107 Before applying this analysis, however, the court dismissed as insignificant
the three possible differences that could distinguish Brzonkala and make Lopez'
logic inapplicable: VAWA is civil and the Lopez statute was criminal; there are
legislative findings here but not in Lopez; and fewer steps of causation exist be-
tween the activity and commerce regulated by VAWA than the activity and com-
merce regulated in Lopez. Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 789-91. The Brzonkala court
found the following similarities to Lopez to be significant: the criminal nature of
both statutes; the non-commercial nature of both statutes; the lack of a jurisdic-
tional requirement that some effect on interstate commerce is involved in each
case; the remoteness of any effect on commerce, and the excessive congressional
power that would logically follow from permitting both statutes based on the Com-
merce Clause. Id. at 789.
'08 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-560.
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ic or non-economic."°9 In fact, the Lopez Court never directly
addressed how a non-economic activity is to be analyzed or
whether regulation of a non-economic activity could ever fall
under Congress' Commerce Clause power. Even though the
Brzonkala Court was presented with a statute and subject
matter completely different from Lopez, the court blindly mim-
icked the form of the Lopez opinion in finding VAWA to be un-
constitutional.
The Brzonkala court stated that "of major importance is
that VAWA involves intrastate activity which is not commer-
cial or even economic in nature. Any interstate nature of
VAWA is insignificant. VAWA regulates local criminal activi-
ty."" ° This was in disregard to the Supreme Court's holding
in Perez v. United States, where the Supreme Court, in defer-
ence to congressional judgment, found that even a purely intra-
state criminal activity could have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce."' The Lopez Court, by mischaracterizing
precedent, distinguished cases where a statute regulates intra-
state activity which is economic in order to find the Gun-Free
School Zone Act unconstitutional. No distinction between eco-
nomic and non-economic activity had ever been previously
made by the Court.
The Lopez Court, in reviewing its Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, concluded that all of its expansive readings of the
Commerce Clause occurred when the activity to be regulated
was economic in nature, and most prominently distinguished
the Wickard case" from the case the court was deciding. In
strict adherence, the Brzonkala court stated, "Lopez teaches
that cases in which the statute at issue regulates intrastate
activity which is economic in nature are analyzed differently
from cases involving non-economic intrastate activity. After
10 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S.
264 (1981); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964).
..0 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 791.
" Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-57.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61. The Court went out of its way to distinguish
Wickard, apparently because, of all of its Commerce Clause cases, it is easiest to
make an argument that the regulated activity in Wickard was not examined by
the Court in terms of whether or not it was an economic activity, but rather in
terms of its effect on interstate commerce. This Comment make3 that argument.
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Lopez, reliance on Wickard to analyze the commerce power in a
case involving a non-economic intrastate activity is untena-
ble.""' However, the Lopez Court never said that legislation
regulating a non-economic activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce could never be sustained, regardless of its
effects on interstate commerce. This is a broad conclusion that
the Lopez Court itself did not reach, and in fact never seemed
to contemplate.
Further, the Lopez Court never set down a rule to be used
in distinguishing economic from non-economic activities. The
Court merely stated that "[w]here economic activity substan-
tially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained."' To illustrate, it provided exam-
ples of its previous cases, stating that "[elven Wickard, which
is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause
authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in
a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does
not.
"115
However, the Wickard Court might not have agreed with
this, and certainly would not agree that this economic/non-eco-
nomic distinction was the basis for its holding that Congress'
power reached the activity of a farmer harvesting wheat for his
own use. While Lopez attempts to distinguish Wickard by
claiming that it concerned regulation of an economic activity,
there is doubt as to whether this activity (harvesting of wheat)
is truly an economic one, as there is with any activity in our
highly interconnected and commercialized society. For, accord-
ing to the Wickard Court, "[elven if appellee's activity be local
and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature be reached by Congress if it exerts a sub-
stantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 116 The
Wickard Court's holding was clearly based on the effect of the
113 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 791.
" Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
115 Id.
11. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). Ironically, the Lopez Court
quoted this same passage, and nevertheless distinguished Wickard as a case in-
volving economic activity. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
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activity on interstate commerce, not whether it was economic
in nature. Thus, while claiming that it was distinguishable,
the Lopez Court explicitly affirmed its decision in Wickard."7
In addition to Wickard, the Lopez Court, while explicitly
affirming its modern Commerce Clause cases, also distin-
guished several of its most prominent Commerce Clause deci-
sions as involving congressional acts regulating intrastate
economic activity."1 ' The Brzonkala court, like the Lopez
Court, cited these cases to support its analysis of a purportedly
non-economic activity whose regulation cannot be upheld under
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence."
It is arguable as to whether all of these cases involved the
regulation of an economic activity. Certainly, the civil rights
cases did not base their holdings on an economic activity; the
activity to be regulated was racial discrimination. The presen-
tation of economic issues was used merely to support the fact
that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that these
activities had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.'
Similarly, Perez involved a regulation of a criminal act,
"loan sharking," because of its effect on interstate commerce,
not because money was involved in the criminal activity."
However, regulation of a criminal activity was exactly how the
Lopez Court found the Gun-Free School Zones Act to be distin-
117 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-61.
I8 Id. at 559.
"' Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792 (citing Lopez 514 U.S. at 559). The cases
cited were: Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation AsYn, Inc., 452 U.S.
264 (1981) (involving intrastate coal mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971) (involving intrastate extortionate credit transactions); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (involving a restaurant refusing to serve people on
the basis of their race); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) (involving a motel refusing guests on the basis of their race).
See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); see also Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 241. The Brzonkaka court next noted that similar to § 922(q) in
Lopez, 'VAWA does not have a jurisdictional requirement limiting each individual
case under VAWA to situations involving interstate commerce. Brzon.ala, 935 F.
Supp. at 792. The court then incorporated this into its analysis as the Lopez
Court seemed to do. However, the Lopez Court did not view this as a necessity, it
described the jurisdictional element as "ensurling], through case-by-case inquiry,
that the [activity] in question affects interstate commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
Only one case, the Bass case, is cited by the Lopez court as an example of includ-
ing this jurisdictional element. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). Surely
if this element was necessary to protect against constitutional infirmity, the Court
would have emphasized it further and provided more than one example.
' Perez, 402 U.S. at 146. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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guishable from regulations it had upheld under the Commerce
Clause in previous decisions." These decisions, especially
Perez, are clearly irreconcilable with Lopez and reveal its con-
voluted reasoning. Neither the Lopez Court nor the Brzonkala
court addressed this issue.
2. Civil Rights and the Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has long permitted Congress' endeav-
ors to promote civil rights using its Commerce Clause power,
as long as there is a rational basis for the legislation. 123 The
Lopez Court did not reject or alter this analysis. Therefore, it is
surprising that the Brzonkala court failed to acknowledge the
Civil Rights implications of VAWA. VAWA was passed as a
civil rights statute." By not acknowledging the civil rights
issue, the Brzonkala court ignored two prominent civil rights
cases decided by the Supreme Court. These decisions allowed
Congress to legislate against discrimination on the basis of
race based on the power provided to Congress by the Com-
merce Clause.' The Brzonkala court, mimicking the Lopez
Court, grouped these cases together with the cases claimed to
have been decided on the basis of the economic nature of the
activity involved.2 However, in both of these cases the activ-
ity to be regulated was racial discrimination, not an economic
activity.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Su-
preme Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in which
Congress used the Commerce Clause to combat racial discrimi-
nation. 7 Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung,2 ' the Court
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
' See McClung, 379 U.S. at 294 (involving a restaurant refusing to serve peo-
ple on the basis of their race); and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (involving a motel refusing guests on the basis of their race).
.24 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
" See McClung, 379 U.S. at 294; and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
12 See supra note 119.
127 379 U.S. 241 at 261. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. See also
Steven Christopher Likes, Casenote, An Utter Disregard for Precedent: Misconstru-
ing Commerce Clause Precedent in United States v. Lopez, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV.
811, 834 (1996).
128 McClung, 379 U.S. at 294. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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upheld the application of the Civil Rights Act to a small, local
restaurant. The Court in both cases deferred to legislative
judgment, finding that there was a rational basis for finding
that racial discrimination substantially affected the flow of
commerce.' The Court used economic considerations only in
reviewing that there was a rational basis for enacting the
legislation.
Both Heart of Atlanta and McClung are analogous to
Brzonkala. Under VAWA, gender-based violence is the type of
discrimination being regulated. As Congress found," even
though these violent acts may occur completely intrastate,
their ramifications are felt throughout the nation. Just as the
hotel and restaurant establishments are connected to inter-
state commerce by their purchase of goods from out of state or
their accommodation of people from out of state, gender-based
violence is connected to interstate commerce by preventing
women from participating in the national economy as consum-
ers and producers. In the aggregate, violence against women
has a tremendous effect on interstate commerce, and has the
potential to keep one-half of the population from fully partic-
ipating in the national economy."3 ' Why shouldn't women,
who are so often targeted because of their sex, receive the
same civil rights protections afforded to other groups who are
also targeted due to bias?
3. Legislative Deference/Rational Basis
Importantly, in the Brzonkala case there existed volumi-
nous Congressional findings that violence against women sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. 2 The Brzonkala court
cited Lopez for the proposition that such findings are not nec-
essary for a determination of whether a rational relation to
interstate commerce exists.' This statement is taken out of
context by the Brzonkala court. The Lopez Coures analysis
went on to note that "congressional findings would enable [it]
Id. at 304; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258, 261-62.
See supra note 16.
1 See supra notes 12-35 and accompanying text for a more detailed explana-
tion of Congressional findings.
See supra notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 789 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63).
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to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in ques-
tion substantially affected interstate commerce, even though
no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye.""
Therefore, the Brzonkala court should have deferred to the
overwhelming Congressional findings to determine the effects
of violence against women on interstate commerce. Instead, the
court concluded that "the fact that the effects need not be in-
ferred in the case at hand is not a very important differ-
ence."' 5 Thus, the Brzonkala court stated that Congressional
findings do not matter since this case is just like Lopez and
involves a non-economic activity. Where, Lopez left open the
possibility that Congressional findings could be persuasive
where the impact on commerce was not readily appreciable,
the Brzonkala court takes it upon itself to rule out this possi-
bility without any further explanation.
If the Brzonkala court had taken into account the detailed
Congressional findings, it would not have to "pile inference
upon inference"3 ' to reach the conclusion that violence
against women substantially affects interstate commerce.137
It would have been able to engage in the rational basis test
that has been the Supreme Court's hallmark for dealing with
Commerce Clause cases and which was explicitly affirmed in
Lopez.
138
13 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563.
1 Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 790.
13 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
13 The Brzonkala court then considered the practical implications of sustaining
VAWA. The court found that "permitting VAWA as a constitutional exercise of the
commerce power would have the practical result of excessively extending
Congress's power and of inappropriately tipping the balance away from the states."
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792. The court expresses its understanding that this
situation is similar to the one in Lopez where the Court came to the same conclu-
sion. However, the statute in Lopez was a criminal one and effectively pre-empted
the states from exercising their police powers in their own way. Here, VAWA is a
civil remedy; it does not supplant any current or contemplated state regulation. It
is only a supplementary remedy for the violation of one's civil rights.
1 The Lopez Court acknowledged the rational basis test stating that "[slince
[Jones & Laughlin Steel] the Court has . . .undertaken to decide whether a ratio-
nal basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected inter-
state commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. However, this is the first and last time
the rational basis test is mentioned in the majority opinion. Presumably, the ratio-
nal basis test would have interfered with finding the statute in question unconsti-
tutional, a result which seemed to be the Court's first and foremost objective.
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Indeed, the Court has used a rational basis test in all of
its prominent Commerce Clause cases spanning over almost
sixty years.'39 In Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation, the
Court found that Congress had rationally determined that the
regulation of surface mining is necessary to protect interstate
commerce from adverse effects that may result from that activ-
ity and sustained the regulation in question."' The Court re-
viewed the findings set forth in the statute itself as well as
Congressional reports. Had the Brzonkala court followed this
precedent requiring "[tihe court [to] defer to a congressional
finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, if
there is any rational basis for such a finding,"14' VAWA cer-
tainly would have been found to be constitutional.
Lopez disregarded the "rational basis test," and articulated
a new standard-the "economic nature of the activity test."
However, the Lopez Court failed to address how to distinguish
an economic activity from a non-economic one, or how to ana-
lyze a statute that regulates a non-economic activity.
Therefore, within this context, Lopez provides no guidance to
future courts and led the Brzonkala court to disregard almost
sixty years of Supreme Court Commerce Clause precedent, as
well as a woman's civil right to be safe from gender-based
violence. As it is practically unworkable, it seems that the
Lopez "economic nature of the activity test" is not a test at
all.' Furthermore, in the language of its own opinion, Lopez
affirms the rational basis test and all of the cases from which
it sprung.' The Brzonkala court was in error when it chose
not to subject VAWA to a rational basis test. If it had, based
on all of the Congressional findings, it certainly would have
found that Congress had a rational basis in determining that
violence against women has substantial and adverse effects on
interstate commerce.
" See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-80; Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-56; Katzenbach, 379
U.S. at 299-301; Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
1'0 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 281. The Court stated "[tihs congressional finding is
sufficient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Com-
merce Clause." Id.
"" Id. at 276 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964).
1 See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text.
1 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The statute and subject matter at issue in the Brzonkala
case are not adequately addressed by simply applying the
same questionable analysis used by the Supreme Court in
Lopez. To do this ignores almost sixty years of Supreme Court
precedent as well as the national problem of violence against
women. After careful deliberation and consideration of much
evidence, Congress found violence against women to have a
harmful and substantial impact on interstate commerce. The
Brzonkala court should have, in following long established
precedent, applied a rational basis test and deferred to legisla-
tive judgment in the face of voluminous Congressional find-
ings. Had this been done, the Court certainly would have found
VAWA to be a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause.
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